The William and Katherine Estes Award will be presented in 2015.
The William and Katherine Estes Award recognizes basic research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that uses rigorous formal and empirical methods to advance our understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war. This award was established by a gift of William and Katherine Estes, and is presented with a $20,000 prize.
William Estes was a member of the National Academy of Sciences. His long career in academia and research contributed a wealth of knowledge to the field of mathematical and cognitive psychology. The first Estes Award (then known as the NAS Award for Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War) was presented in 1990 to Robert Axelrod for his imaginative use of game theory, experimentation, and computer simulation to define and test strategies for confrontation and cooperation and other models of social interaction.
The most recent Estes Award was presented in 2012 to Robert Powell of the University of California, Berkeley, for his sophisticated game theoretic models of conflict that illuminate the heart of the strategic dilemmas of nuclear deterrence, including the importance of private information.
Robert Powell (2012)
For sophisticated game theoretic models of conflict that illuminate the heart of the strategic dilemmas of nuclear deterrence, including the importance of private information.
Graham Allison (2009)
For illuminating alternative ways of thinking about political decision making with special relevance to crises, including nuclear crises, as demonstrated in his groundbreaking Essence of Decision and subsequent works.
Robert Jervis (2006)
For showing, scientifically and in policy terms, how cognitive psychology, politically contextualized, can illuminate strategies for the avoidance of nuclear war.
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (2003)
For their joint work on transnational terrorism using game theory and time series analysis to document the cyclic and shifting nature of terrorist attacks in response to defensive counteractions.
Philip E. Tetlock (2000)
For successfully developing a semantic measure of cognitive complexity predictive of foreign policy decisions and for applying psychological analysis and knowledge to nuclear policy problems.
Alexander L. George (1997)
For combining theory with history to elucidate the requirements of deterrence, the limits to coercive diplomacy, and the relationship between force and statecraft.
Thomas C. Schelling (1993)
For his pioneering work on the logic of military strategy, nuclear war, and arms races, which has profoundly influenced our understanding of this crucial subject.
Robert Axelrod (1990)
For his imaginative use of game theory, experimentation, and computer simulation to define and test strategies for confrontation and cooperation and other models of social interaction.